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I. INTRODUCTION
T he use and abuse of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organi-
zations Act ("RICO")' has troubled judges and lawyers for some time
while providing fertile ground for commentators. The plethora of RICO
cases is equalled only by the tremendous proliferation of commentary.
This Article, while admittedly contributing to this proliferation, is
excusable, however, because its purpose is to facilitate summary dispo-
sition of RICO claims by providing a practical guide to achieving early
dismissal under Rules 12(b)(6) and 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. 2
* Associate, Sills Cummis Zuckerman Radin Tischman Epstein & Gross, P.A., New-
ark, New Jersey. B.A., Wagner College (1976), J.D., Yale University (1982). The author
gratefully acknowledges the insights provided by Charles J. Walsh, a member of the same
firm, and expresses the deepest gratitude to Royal Howard and Muriel Howard.
1 Pub. L. No. 91-452, tit. IX, § 901(a), 84 Stat. 941-944 (1970), codified at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1961-1968 (1984).
2 Citation to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure suggests that the action will be in
federal court. While this will be true in mosts cases, a number of courts have held that state
courts have concurrent jurisdiction over RICO claims. See Knox, Jurisdiction and Civil
RICO, 22 Toar & INs. L.J. 457 (1987), and cases cited therein. Moreover, a number ofstates
have enacted their own anti-racketeering statutes that are modeled after RICO and
construed in pari materia. Martinez & Richards, CCA-RICO: Reflections On A Sleeper, 16
RutrrcEs L.J. 655 (1985); Kredietbank, N.V. v. Joyce Morris, Inc., No. 84-1903, slip op. at 8-9
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H. THE "PATERN" OF RACKETEERING AcTIVrTY
RICO provides for an award of treble damages to "[amny person injured
in his business or property by reason of a violation of Section 1962" of the
statute.3 Section 1962 defines prohibited activities with reference to
conduct that constitutes a "pattern of racketeering activity." The statute
provides that a pattern requires "at least two acts of racketeering
activity,"4 and enumerates a variety of federal and state offenses that
qualify as racketeering predicates.5 That no RICO claim can survive in
the absence of a "pattern" of racketeering activity has never been in
dispute.6 The same cannot be said for precisely what it is that constitutes
such a "pattern."
Until mid-1985, the prevailing view was that any two or more
predicate acts would satisfy RICO's "pattern" requirement.7 This view
has been almost completely superseded by the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Sedima, S.P.RL. v. Imrex Co.8 The Supreme Court
rejected the notion that a RICO plaintiff must either plead a competitive
injury or plead that the defendant was previously convicted of the
predicate offenses. The Court held that there was no indication that
Congress intended to erect such barriers, suggesting instead that RICO
overuse be curbed by construing the term "pattern" as requiring both
continuity and relationship between and among predicate acts. 9 The
Court deemed this appropriate because the legislative history revealed
that this was how Congress intended the term "pattern" to be interpreted.
In the two years since Sedima, courts throughout the nation have
increasingly dismissed RICO complaints for failure to plead a "pattern" of
racketeering activity; however, the definition of that term remains
unsettled.
n.2 (D.N.J. Jan. 9, 1986)(WESTLAW, DCT database), affd without op., 808 F.2d 1516 (3d
Cir. 1986). The grounds for dismissal discussed in this Article are for the most part equally
applicable to claims asserted under these state anti-racketeering statutes-with the length
of the statute of limitations being an exception-though the proper time for moving (e.g.,
before or after answering) will vary according to local civil practice.
3 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)(1984).
4 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5)(1984).
6 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(1984).
8 Morgan v. Bank of Waukegan, 804 F.2d 970, 973 (7th Cir. 1986); H.G. Gallimore, Inc.
v. Abdula, 652 F. Supp. 437 (N.D. Ill. 1987); Eastern Corporate Fed. Credit Union v. Peat,
Marwick Mitchell & Co., 639 F. Supp. 1532 (D. Mass. 1986).
' See, e.g., United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971, 1038-39 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied
sub nom, Meinster v. United States, 457 U.S. 1136 (1982); United States v. Weatherspoon,
581 F.2d 595, 601-02 (7th Cir. 1978); Beth Israel Medical Center v. Smith, 576 F. Supp.
1061, 1065-66 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
s 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
I ld. at 496 n.14.
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Footnote 14 of Sedima, the blueprint for decisional law in this area,'0
provides in part:
[T]he definition of a "pattern of racketeering activity" differs
from the other provisions in § 1961 in that it states that a pattern
"requires at least two acts of racketeering activity," not that it
"means" two such acts. The implication is that while two acts are
necessary, they may not be sufficient .... The legislative history
supports the view that two isolated acts of racketeering activity
do not constitute a pattern. As the Senate Report explained: 'The
target of [RICO] is thus not sporadic activity. The infiltration of
legitimate business normally requires more than one 'racketeer-
ing activity' and the threat of continuing activity to be effective.
It is this factor of continuity plus relationship which combines to
produce a pattern."... Significantly, in defining 'pattern' in a
later provision of the same bill, Congress was more enlightening:
"Criminal conduct forms a pattern if it embraces criminal acts
that have the same or similar purposes, results, participants,
victims, or methods of commission, or otherwise are interrelated
by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated events."
This language may be useful in interpreting other sections of the
Act."
Sedima's "pattern" pronouncement has the potential for being the most
substantial barrier to successful civil RICO actions since the Second
Circuit's "criminal conviction" and "competitive injury" restrictions
rejected by Sedima. However, there has been disagreement as to how, or
even if, the Supreme Court's guidance should be applied.
At least three approaches are currently used to determine whether a
plaintiff has pled a RICO "pattern."12 Under the first approach, "when
two acts which relate to each other and arise out of the same scheme are
alleged, the requirement of pleading a 'pattern of racketeering activity'
10 'Interpretation of this footnote is now a cottage industry." Morris v. Gilbert, 649 F.
Supp. 1491, 1502 (E.D.N.Y. 1986).
" 473 U.S. 479 at 496 n.14 (emphasis original). See also Powell, J., dissenting:
The definition of 'pattern' may thus logically be interpreted as meaning that the
presence of the predicate acts is only the beginning- something more is required
for a pattern' to be proved. The ABA Report concurs in this view. It argues
persuasively that'[tihe "pattern" element of the Statute was designed to limit its
application to planned, ongoing, continuing crime as opposed to sporadic, unre-
lated, isolated criminal episodes.'
473 U.S. 479 at 527.
12 Gidwitz v. Stirco, Inc., 646 F. Supp. 825, 829 (N.D. Ill. 1986); Schaafsma v. Marriner,
641 F. Supp. 576, 578 n.2 (D. Vt.), rev'd in part on other grounds sub nom, Schaafsma v.
Morin Vermont Corp., 802 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1986).
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has been met."' 3 Under this approach, any two or more related predicate
acts are a pattern. In R.A.G.S. Couture, Inc. v. Hyatt,14 for example, the
court found a pattern based on plaintiff's allegation that the same false
invoices had been mailed by the defendant on two occasions, first to
plaintiff and then to plaintiff's attorney.15 Under this "related acts" test,
which disregards Sedima by treating its "continuity" guidance as dicta,
almost every fraud is a "pattern" since given modern means of commu-
nication it is virtually impossible to defraud someone without using the
mails or interstate wire communications at least twice.' 6
It should be noted that the "related acts" test is distinguishable from
the pre-Sedima test. Whereas the "related acts" test requires relationship
between or among predicates, the test before Sedima required neither
relationship nor continuity. Although the Sedima court devoted compar-
atively less attention to the continuity requirement than to relationship,
there is no rational basis for accepting its guidance on relationship while
rejecting its pronouncement on continuity. They either both control or
they are both dicta. Because of this flawed logic, the "related acts"
approach has been steadily declining in popularity and now represents a
minority view, though it has garnered strength recently in a somewhat
revised form in the Second Circuit.17
" Conan Properties, Inc. v. Mattel, Inc., 691 F. Supp. 1167, 1170 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
14 774 F.2d 1350 (5th Cir. 1985).
1' Id. at 1354-55. RA.G.S., the principal case supporting the "related acts" test, has
been criticized for "wholly ignor[ing] the concept of "continuity" of criminal activity
emphasized by Congress and the Supreme Court." Papagiannis v. Pontikis, 108 F.R.D. 177,
179 n-3 (N.D. M. 1985). Moreover, it appears that RA.G.S. is no longer good law in the Fifth
Circuit or is at least about to become bad law. RA.G.S. was decided only a few months
after Sedima, before the full implications of the Supreme Court's "pattern" pronouncement
had been recognized. Five months after R.A.G.S., the Fifth Circuit had occasion to comment
on the "pattern" issue in Smoky Greenshaw Cotton Co. v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 785 F.2d 1274 (Sth Cir. 1986). This time, without any reference to R.A.G.S., the
court recognized the new restrictive definition of "pattern" but did not have occasion to
apply it. Id. at 1280 n.7. Thereafter, in Montesano v. Seafirst Commercial Corp., 818 F.2d
423 (5th Cir. 1987), a Fifth Circuit panel that included one of the Judges participating in
RA.G.S., was persuaded that the court must reject R.A.G.S.' "pattern" test "in order to
faithfully serve congressional purpose." Id. at 426. The court did not overturn RA.GS.
because of the internal rule forbidding one panel overturning another, but strongly urged
that RA.G.S. be overruled en bane. Id. For other post-Sedima cases disregarding the
continuity element of the "pattern" test, see Bankers Trust Co. v. Feldesman, 648 F. Supp.
17,24-26 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. Touche Ross & Co., 782
F.2d 966, 970 (11th Cir. 1986); Tryco Trucking Co. v. Belk Stores Servs., Inc., 634 F. Supp.
1327,1334 (W.D.N.C. 1986); WVatts v. Hadden, 627 F. Supp. 727, 734-35 (D. Colo. 1986); LSC
Assocs. v. Lomas Nettleton Fin. Corp., 629 F. Supp. 979, 981 (E.D. Pa. 1986); American
Principals Corp. v. Imperial Bank, RICO Bus. Disp. Guide (CCH) V 6373, 6146 (C.D. Cal.
1986); Brainerd v. Bridges, RICO Bus. Disp. Guide (CCH) 6414, 6260-64 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
16 See, e.g., Small v. Goldman, 637 F. Supp. 1030 (D.N.J. 1986); International Data
Bank, Ltd. v. Zepkin, 812 F.2d 149, 154-55 (4th Cir. 1987).
17 See infra note 26.
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The remaining approaches apply Sedima's "continuity plus relation-
ship" test but differ on the means of doing so. Before addressing the
approaches, it is necessary to consider the meaning of continuity and
relationship. While Sedima's fourteenth footnote provided guidance on
the subject, the task of formulating operational definitions was left to the
lower federal courts, initially at the trial level. After two years of
adjudication of pattern cases, it may be said that "relationship" is usually
evidenced by common perpetrators, common victims or types of victims,
common methods of commission and common motives or purposes.' 8 This
is essentially the same definition of relationship as suggested by the
Sedima Court.
Owing to relative silence by the Supreme Court in defining continuity,
the lower courts have fashioned their own definitions. In doing so, lower
federal courts have held that continuity requires that the defendant's
criminal activities be ongoing and open-ended; that they occur over a
substantial period of time and be substantively differentiated; that they
create a threat of future criminal activity; and that they epitomize a
defendant's usual course of conduct rather than evidencing sporadic
behavior or aberrant episodes.19 Considered together, the requirements of
continuity and relationship are obviously designed to insure that RICO
liability will be imposed only on someone who has repeatedly engaged in
the same type of proscribed behavior over a significant period of time.
Returning to the approaches employed in determining whether conti-
nuity and relationship have been pled, the "multiple schemes" test
provides there can be no pattern if all predicate acts were undertaken in
is Torwest DBC, Inc. v. Dick, 810 F.2d 925 (10th Cir. 1987); H-J. Inc. v. Northwestern
Bell Tel. Co., 653 F. Supp. 908, 910 (D. Minn. 1987).
19 Torwest, 810 F.2d 925 (10th Cir. 1987); Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture
Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1398-99 (9th Cir. 1986); Cefali v. Buffalo Brass Co., 653 F. Supp. 263
(W.D.N.Y. 1986); Papa v. Cremosnik, 635 F. Supp. 1402, 1412 (N.D. IM. 1986). In
Nassau-Suffolk Ice Cream v. Integrated Resources, 662 F. Supp. 1499, 1505 (S.D.N.Y.
1987), the court opined that:
[T]he continuity judgment maybe informed by a confluence of factors considered
on a case by case basis. Thus, the court may consider the number and variety of
the predicate acts, the length of time over which they were alleged to be
committed, the number of victims, whether multiple schemes are alleged, and the
nature and diversity of the injuries alleged.
This approach is eclectic to the point of being meaningless. It eliminates neutral principles
and the predictability to which they lead and thus invites plaintiffs to file civil RICO claims
no matter how much doubt there may be as to the basis for so proceeding. See also
Barticheck v. Fidelity Union Bank, No. 86-5870 (3d Cir. Oct. 29, 1987) (WESTLAW, CTA
database) (to be reported at 832 F.2d 36), where the court rejected a literal interpretation of
the "open endedness" component of the continuity test, noting that such an "approach would
allow a party to maintain a RICO claim if he brought suit before the unlawful scheme had
attained its objective... [but] would deny a RICO cause of action in a case where the scheme
had fully accomplished its goal."
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furtherance of the same criminal scheme, episode or objective. 20 Under
this view, if the alleged injury derives from a single transaction, the
claim is dismissed without further attention. The rationale is that there
can be no continuity and differentiation over time if there is but a single
scheme. Under this test, for a pattern to exist, there must be independent
schemes, but they must not be so independent that they are unrelated,
since in that event the relationship test would not be satisfied. In sum,
although finding a single scheme will defeat the RICO claim, finding
multiple schemes will not necessarily sustain it.21 This exemplifies the
fact that continuity, whatever it is, is more than mere duration over time.
The "multiple schemes" approach, which was the first test adopted to
implement Sedima's pattern pronouncement, is being increasingly re-
jected on two grounds. First, it results in the dismissal of single-scheme
transactions that are sufficiently differentiated and ongoing to legiti-
mately satisfy the requirements of continuity and relationship. Secondly,
no accepted formula has been developed which quantifies the number of
schemes underlying a RICO claim. Consequently, faced with the same set
of facts, one court might reasonably conclude there was a single overall
scheme comprised of many sub-schemes, while another court might just
as reasonably find multiple schemes by focusing on the components. In
sum, the test is inherently arbitrary. It does, however, have the advan-
tage of administrative convenience: once a court determines there is only
one scheme, however defined, it may dismiss without considering any
other alleged facts. A growing number of courts have been willing to
sacrifice this convenience to insure that every genuine RICO plaintiff has
his day in court.22
21 Madden v. Gluck, 815 F.2d 1163 (8th Cir. 1987); Deviries v. Prudential-Bache Sec.,
Inc., 805 F.2d 326 (8th Cir. 1986); H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 653 F. Supp. 908
(D. Minn. 1987); Small, 637 F. Supp. at 1034; Bigger v. American Commercial Lines, Inc.,
652 F. Supp. 123 (W.D. Mo. 1986); Skycom Corp. v. Telstar Corp., 813 F.2d 810 (7th Cir.
1987); Superior Oil Co. v. Fulmer, 785 F.2d 252 (8th Cir. 1986); McBee v. IHSS, Inc., 655
F.Supp. 448 (D. Colo. 1987); Corcoran v. American Plan Corp., RICO Bus. Disp. Guide
(CCII) 6539, 6666 (E.D.N.Y. 1987).
2' An inherent tension exists between continuity and relationship because the similar-
ity required to satisfy the relationship test always threatens to defeat the differentiation
needed to satisfy the continuity test. See, e.g., United States v. Freshie Co., 639 F. Supp.
442, 445 (E.D. Pa. 1986):
Viewed on a continuum, these two requirements must reach some equitable
balance to form a "pattern" ... One can easily see that as the acts become more
related, the same transactions lose some of their separateness. On the other hand,
if a series of predicate acts satisfied the requirement of separate "criminal
episodes," then those acts might well not meet the relatedness requirement, being
too disjointed (different subject matter) and too remote (in time). (emphasis
original)(citation omitted).
22 Two of the better discussions of the problems inherent in the 'nultiple schemes" test
are found in Bridges v. Weingeroff Enter., Inc., RICO Bus. Disp. Guide (CC-) 6414, 6258
(N.D. i1. 1986) and McLendon v. Continental Group, Inc., RICO Bus. Disp. Guide (CCH)
(Vol. 35:423
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol35/iss3/6
19871 MOVING TO DISMISS A CIVIL RICO ACTION 429
The remaining view provides that no mechanical test can resolve the
"pattern" question, and each case must therefore be examined on its facts
to determine whether the alleged predicate acts have achieved that
equitable balance of continuity and relationship necessary to make a
"pattern."23 This case-by-case or intermediate approach, which developed
after the "multiple schemes" test, has now become the majority view. 24
Under the intermediate approach, a tremendous amount of discretion is
placed in the trial judge, whose fact-based "pattern" determination is less
likely to be reversed than a legal ruling as to the number of schemes.
Although this reduces predictability with respect to the survival of any
particular RICO claim, application of the case-by-case approach has led to
numerous dismissals, though not as many as under the "multiple
schemes" approach. This is to be expected since the case-by-case approach
is designed to sustain single-scheme patterns that would not survive the
"multiple schemes" test. Thus, the case-by-case approach is not only
analytically intermediate between the "related acts" test and the "mul-
tiple schemes" approach, but is also middle of the road in terms of its
impact on the sustainability of RICO actions under the "pattern" test in
general.25
Notwithstanding these somewhat artificial distinctions, one should not
lose sight of the fact that the "multiple schemes" and intermediate
approaches are fundamentally the same. Each inquires as to continuity
and relationship and consults the same indicia to find them. 26 However,
16374,6146 (D.N.. 1986). See also Kearny v. Hudson Meadows Urban Renewal Corp., 829
F.2d 1263 (3d Cir. 1987).
23 Barticheck v. Fidelity Union Bank, No. 86-5870 (3d Cir. Oct. 29, 1987) (WESTLAW,
CTA database) (to be reported at 832 F.2d 36); Sun Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Dierdorff, 825 F.2d
187 (9th Cir. 1987); Bank of Am. Natl Trust & Say. Ass'n v. Touche Ross & Co., 782 F.2d
966 (11th Cir. 1986); Illinois Dep't of Revenue v. Phillips, 711 F.2d 312 (7th Cir. 1985);
International Data Bank, Ltd. v. Zepkin, 812 F.2d 149, 155; Roeder v. Alpha Indus., Inc.,
814 F.2d 22, 31 (1st Cir. 1987); Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Big Apple Indus. Bldgs., Inc., 655
F. Supp. 1179 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Chronister v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 653 F. Supp. 1576, 1583
(M.D. Pa. 1987); Roberts v. Smith Barney Harris Upham & Co., Inc., 653 F. Supp. 406, 412
(D. Mass. 1986); Environmental Tectonics Corp. v. W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co., 659 F. Supp.
1381, (D.N.J. 1987).
24 See Brodsky, Pattern'Requirement Under RICO, N.Y.L.J., September 9, 1987, at 1,
col. 1, contrasting the Second Circuit's "related acts" approach with the Eighth Circuit's
"multiple schemes" approach. See also Black, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza-
tions - Securities and Commercial Fraud as Racketeering Crime after Sedima: 'What is a
Pattern of Racketeering Activity?, 6 PACE L. REv. 365 (1986).
2 See Note, RICO: Limiting Suits By Altering The Pattern, 28 Wa. & MARY L. REV. 177
(1986); Batista, Seventh Circuit Complicates RICO Defense, 9 NATAL L.J. 39 (June 8, 1987).
2' There is, however, more than one way to find "continuity." In Beck v. Manufacturers
Hanover Trust Co., 820 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1987), the court held that in order to plead a
pattern, it is necessary only to allege two or more related predicate acts. But the
requirement of continuity was not entirely dispensed with. Rather, the court held it was
necessarily satisfied by the requirement for pleading an "enterprise," since one of the
7Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1987
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a court employing the "multiple schemes" test will examine these
elements only if it first concludes there is more than one scheme.2 7 All
three approaches are somewhat heuristic. It is best to view them as points
along a continuum. Characterizing RICO pattern decisions as falling into
one of the above "tests" serves to impose order on chaos rather than to
accurately reflect chaotic reality.
The plaintiffs' bar has failed to adjust to the restrictive interpretation
of "pattern" suggested by Sedima and implemented by the lower federal
courts. As a result, a substantial percentage of RICO claims will continue
to be dismissed for failure to properly plead a "pattern." Many plaintiffs
allege injury to their business or property arising from what is essentially
a unidimensional scheme or transaction. Sometimes plaintiff is the only
party who sustained injury, as where plaintiff was the purchaser in a
private sale of closely held securities. On other occasions, plaintiff may be
one of many similarly situated parties who were injured at or about the
same time under similar circumstances, as where plaintiff and others
purchased publicly traded securities in reliance on the same misleading
prospectus. 28 When many parties are injured, the RICO action may take
definitional components of an enterprise is continued existence over time. Id. at 51. Query
whether such an analysis is applicable only in jurisdictions where the attributes of the
enterprise must be pled (see text infra). Since the continued existence of the enterprise has
no direct connection to the continuity of the alleged RICO predicates, Beck's lip service to
Sedima's continuity dicta has no significance and Beck is thus nothing more than the latest
manifestation of the Second Circuit's adoption of a "related acts" approach. Its predecessors
include United States v. Ianiello, 808 F.2d 184 (2d Cir. 1986), and United States v.
Weisman, 624 F.2d 1118 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 871 (1980). Beck does clarify that
the Circuit's 'pattern" pronouncement in criminal cases applies on the civil side as well. See
Khaimi v. Schonenberger, 664 F. Supp. 54, 56-57 (E.D.N.Y. 1987).
27 Courts adopting the intermediate approach generally criticize the "multiple schemes"
test for being overbroad. While it succeeds in screening out RICO claims that lack the
requisite continuity and relationship, there will be occasions when its application may
result in dismissal of single-scheme conduct that does manifest sufficient continuity and
relationship among predicate offenses. Morgan v. Bank of Waukegan, 804 F.2d 970, 975
(7th Cir. 1986); Roeder, 814 F.2d at 31; Paul S. Mullin & Assocs., Inc. v. Bassett, 632 F.
Supp. 532, 541 (D. Del. 1986); Roberts, 653 F. Supp. at 411. Thus, a defendant with a single
objective might engage in predicate acts that are sufficiently numerous and differentiated
and extend over a sufficient length of time that a court would be justified in finding a
"pattern" notwithstanding that there is only one ultimate objective. Only in cases such as
these will the two approaches lead to different results since they both seek the same goal,
but the "multiple schemes" test paints with a broader brush.
2' Since continuity is purely a temporal concept, it should not be increased by an
increase in the number of victims, assuming they were all injured at the same time. See
Brandenburg v. First Maryland Sav. & Loan, 660 F. Supp. 717 (D. Md. 1987). But see Lipin
Enters., Inc. v. Lee, 803 F.2d 322, 324 (7th Cir. 1986); Tkaczuk v. Weil, No. 86-C-4695
(N.D. Ill. Jan. 29, 1987)(WESTLAW, DCT database) (suggesting that a multiplicity of
victims may increase the likelihood of pleading a pattern); Barticheck v. Fidelity Union
Bank, No. 86-5870 (3d Cir. Oct. 29, 1987) (WESTLAW, CTA database) (to be re-
ported at 832 F.2d 36). See also Gutfreund v. Christoph, 658 F. Supp 1378 (N.D. Ill. 1987),
[Vol. 35:423
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the form of a class action. Plaintiff will assert multiple acts-usually
wire, mail and securities fraud. Under these circumstances, and assum-
ing the fraud was quickly accomplished, it is unlikely that a "pattern"
will be sustained under the 'multiple schemes" test or the intermediate
approach, since the pleading will not establish that the defendant was in
the habit of committing the type of crime charged.
Assuming that the injury-producing activities occurred over a short
period of time and that each alleged predicate was designed to accomplish
the same objective, a court adopting the "multiple schemes" test will
dismiss the RICO claim because there was only a single scheme or
episode of criminal conduct and, a fortiori, the requirement of "continu-
ity" has not been met.29 In Emmanouilides v. Buckthorn, Ltd.,30 for
example, the court refused to find a pattern based on the allegation that
in which District Judge Shadur, constrained (and obviously annoyed) by recent Seventh
Circuit pronouncements, found a "pattern" when interests in the same limited partnership
were sold to 16 different people over a several-month period. Id. at 1392-93.
9 See, e.g., Kearny v. Hudson Meadows Urban Renewal Corp., 648 F. Supp. 1412, 1418
(D. N.J. 1986) rev'd on other grounds, 829 F.2d 1263 (3d Cir. 1987) (three different bribes in
exchange for related but distinct promises are not sufficiently ongoing to form a pattern);
Small v. Goldman, 637 F. Supp. 1030, 1034 (D. N.J. 1986)(defendante' commission of mail
fraud on two or more occasions "in order to implement, effectuate and conceal their scheme
to defraud plaintiff... do[es] not constitute a pattern of racketeering where all of them were
aimed at implementing a single fraudulent scheme"); Kredietbank, N.V. v. Joyce Morris,
Inc., No. 84-1903 (D. N.J. Oct. 11, 1985), reconsideration denied, (D. N.J. Jan. 9, 1986), aff'd
without op., 808 F.2d 1516 (3d Cir. 1986)(two instances of submitting false affidavits to
court in connection with single matter under litigation are not a "pattern" of racketeering
activity); Superior Oil Co. v. Fulmer, 785 F.2d 252 (8th Cir. 1986)(several related acts of
mail and wire fraud in pursuit of underlying conversion or theft are not a "pattern");
Emmanouilides v. Buckthorn, Ltd., 642 F. Supp. 964,966 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)("Any fraudulent
mail or wire communications made in connection with this case are not themselves
allegeable as parts of a pattern; rather, they are the components of a single activity, the
alleged vessel fraud. Plaintiff may not splinter the alleged fraud into its subordinate pieces
in an attempt to meet the RICO pattern requirement'); Northern Trust Bank/O'Hare, N.A.
v. Inryco, Inc., 615 F. Supp. 828 (N.D. 111. 1985)(two mailings to effectuate same kickback
scheme are not a "pattern"); Allington v. Carpenter, 619 F. Supp. 474 (C.D. Cal. 1985)(mul-
tiple acts of fraud over fourteen-month period were in furtherance of one scheme and
therefore did not constitute a "pattern"); Professional Assets Management, Inc. v. Penn
Square Bank, N.A., 616 F.Supp. 1418 (W.D. Okla. 1985)(multiple actions in furtherance of
preparation and issuance of allegedly fraudulent audit report do not constitute a "pattern");
Grant v. Union Bank, 629 F. Supp. 570, 578 (D. Utah 1986)("We consider that multiple mail
and wire communications in furtherance of that single allegedly fraudulent loan are
insufficient to show a pattern under RICO"); Lipin Enters., Inc. v. Lee, 625 F. Supp. 1098
(N.D. Ill. 1985), aff'd, 803 F.2d 322 (7th Cir. 1986)(twelve predicate acts of mail fraud in
furtherance of scheme to defraud purchaser of securities is not a pattern). See also Torwest
DBC, Inc. v. Dick, 810 F.2d 925 (10th Cir. 1987); H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 648
F. Supp. 419, 423 (D. Minn. 1986); Satellite Fin. Planning Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank of
Wilmington, 646 F. Supp. 118 (D. Del. 1986).
"0 642 F. Supp. 964.
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defendant generated many phone calls and letters in order to defraud
plaintiff in the simultaneous sale of seven vessels, noting that "[pilaintiff
may not splinter the alleged fraud into its subordinate pieces in an
attempt to meet the RICO pattern requirement." 1 That each call or letter
may have constituted a separate indictable offense under the wire or mail
fraud-statutes was deemed irrelevant to establishing a RICO pattern.
The same result should obtain under the intermediate approach, where
the court will look directly to the aforementioned indicia of continuity
and relationship. However, the likelihood of dismissal will be less since a
court will be more likely to discern a "pattern" as the duration and
complexity of the underlying events increase.3 2 It is impossible to state
what length of time or degree of complexity or differentiation will serve
as the threshold for finding a pattern. Given that the intermediate
approach is by definition a "case-by-case" approach, no hard and fast
rules apply.33 Still assuming a short and simple scenario (e.g., a single
purchase of securities), the relationship test will be satisfied, since there
is an identity of perpetrators, victims, methods of commission, and
motives. However, there will be a lack of continuity and the differentia-
tion that is needed for a pattern to exist. The transaction is neither
ongoing nor open-ended and does not create a threat of future criminality
or the inference that it is representative of the defendant's normal and
ongoing course of conduct.3 4 To factually allege that a defendant made
two or more phone calls or mailed two or more letters to accomplish a
single objective appears insufficient to properly establish a "pattern" of
racketeering activity. This is the message of nearly all courts recently
deciding RICO pattern cases. Whether they adopt the "multiple schemes"
31 Id. at 966.
32 See, e.g., King v. E.F. Hutton & Co., RICO Bus. Disp. Guide (CCH) 6578, 6836 (D.
D.C. 1987)(pattern properly pled when brokerage firm defrauded several investors over a
two and one-half year period); McLendon v. Continental Group, Inc., RICO Bus. Disp. Guide
(CCH) 6146, 6373 (D.N.J. 1986)(pattern properly pled when numerous employees were
deprived of pension benefits over a period of several years by means of elaborate
computerized system).
"3 The problem with characterizing decisions under the intermediate approach is that
there is no unified approach. Rather, the intermediate cases are what is left over after the
"related acts" and '"multiple schemes" cases are subtracted from the total body of pattern
cases. To predict how a particular RICO pleading will fare, one must consult the case law
of the jurisdiction where the action is pending. The best way to make a general prediction
is to test the pleading under the most stringent "multiple schemes" approach. Provided it
survives this test, it will probably survive any other test as well. If it fails this test, one must
inquire whether the case fits within that small subset of cases that would be dismissed
under the '"multiple schemes" test but should be salvaged by the intermediate approach.
Duration and complexity of the liability-producing acts will be critical to this determina-
tion.
' H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 653 F. Supp. 908, 911 (D. Minn. 1987)("con-
tinuity" means repeated criminal activity, not merely repeated acts to carry out the same
criminal activity).
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approach or look directly to indicia of continuity and relationship, no
pattern is found under such circumstances. Only if the events underlying
the lawsuit are complex and differentiated and take place over a
substantial period of time might the result be otherwise. The number of
people injured by defendant's activities should be irrelevant, as it is the
duration and complexity of the causal act-not its effect-that deter-
mines whether the defendant habitually engaged in proscribed conduct.3 5
Some plaintiffs allege that the defendant committed additional predi-
cates at a point in time removed from the first group of predicates, thus
seeking to create continuity where none would otherwise be found.
Whether a "pattern" may thus be established will depend on the facts of
the case. If plaintiff is the victim in all the episodes and has sustained
each injury in a similar fashion (i.e., as a result of similar "methods of
commission" by the defendant), a court should conclude that a "pattern"
has been alleged.36 This would occur, for example, if the defendant
fraudulently sold different securities to the plaintiff on three separate
occasions over a period of several years, or perhaps even several months.
A pattern should also be found if the additional episodes did not injure
the plaintiff but caused a similar type of injury to similarly-situated
persons.37 To hold otherwise would be to restrict civil RICO to plaintiffs
who themselves were repeatedly injured by the same pattern of racke-
teering activity. While RICO's civil liability provisions are largely
remedial, the statute as a whole seeks to deter conduct that causes harm
to the public at large, and civil damages are trebled partly to accomplish
this goal. If the standing requirement was so narrow as to preclude a
plaintiff from asserting any predicate acts that caused harm to others,
this goal would be inhibited,38 since a criminal could methodically
3r See supra note 28.
"' Lipin Enters. Inc. v. Lee, 803 F.2d 322, 324 (7th Cir. 1986).
37 Id.
" But see Kearny v. Hudson Meadows Urban Renewal Corp., 648 F. Supp. 1412, 1418
(D.N.J. 1986), rev'd, 829 F.2d 1263 (3d Cir. 1987), where the trial court observed that
"plaintiff cannot simply allege that some acts in a larger pattern injured it; the acts that
caused plaintiffs injury, in themselves, must constitute a pattern." The appellate court
disagreed. 829 F.2d at 1268. Although a RICO plaintiff directly injured by at least one
predicate should have standing to assert additional predicates causing injury to others, it is
difficult to understand why this has not been done more frequently. Many RICO defendants
are large corporations repeatedly sued under RICO by many different plaintiffs in many
different jurisdictions. If a plaintiff had standing to allege that injury caused by the
corporation to others could form part of the "pattern" for his RICO action against the same
corporation, he could conduct a computer search and locate scores if not hundreds of cases
in which the same defendant had injured or allegedgly injured others through similar types
of racketeering activity. The cases do not bear this out. In the majority of reported decisions,
the only conduct alleged by a plaintiff is that which caused injury to him alone and many
such cases are dismissed for failure to plead a pattern. When a plaintiff does refer to other
victims (or all such victims combine in a class action), it usually involves victims of the
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execute a pattern of fraudulent conduct in such a way that none of his
victims was injured by more than one RICO "episode," with the result
that he would be insulated from civil liability to any victim under
RICO.3D There is no indication that Congress intended RICO to be so
limited or that courts are willing to adopt such an obviously inequitable
approach.
However, if the temporally discrete episodes involved unrelated and
isolated methods of commission, then whether they caused injury to
plaintiff alone or to plaintiff and others, there should be no pattern
because neither relationship nor continuity will be found. This was the
result in Robinson v. City Colleges of Chicago.40 Plaintiff, through his
corporations, provided food and cleaning services to the defendant college
until his services were dispensed with. His RICO action against the
college involved two discrete episodes separated by a five-year period.
First, he alleged that in 1981 the defendant wrongfully rejected his bid to
provide janitorial services. Next, he alleged that in 1986 the defendant
wrongfully rejected his bid to provide food services.4 1 The court dismissed
the complaint for failure to plead a RICO "pattern."
Having asserted multiple predicates underlying the 1986 event,
Robinson first argued that this alone constituted a "pattern." The court
correctly held otherwise because of the absence of continuity, a result
that would have been reached under the "multiple schemes" test and the
intermediate approach, with this court adopting the former:
[T]he allegedly wrongful mailings occurred within a short period
of about four months and all closely related to the manual and
vending food services contract. If fraud was involved, it occurred
same circumscribed criminal episode, with the result that the suit is also dismissed for lack
of continuity.
ss See Papagiannis v. Pontikis, 108 F.R.D. 177 (N.D. Ill. 1985)("(Elach victim can sue
the RICO violator, adducing evidence of the offense against the other victim to meet the
proof requirements of the statute as to a 'pattern")(emphasis in original omitted); Lipin
Enters., Inc., 803 F.2d at 324 (suggesting that plaintiffs could plead a pattern had they
alleged that the defendants defrauded other victims in a similar fashion); King v. E.F.
Hutton & Co., Inc., RICO Bus. Disp. Guide (CCH) 16578,6836 (D. D.C. 1987); McLendon v.
Continental Group., Inc., RICO Bus. Disp. Guide (CCH) 6146,6310 (D. N.J. 1986); Kearny
v. Hudson Meadows Urban Renewal Corp., 829 F.2d 1263 (3d Cir. 1987). The case law
suggests, but does not clearly hold, that the RICO pattern maybe based in part on predicates
that caused injury to persons other than plaintiff. Thus, while plaintiffs recovery of
damages would be limited by the injury he alone suffered, the "pattern" may be proved
through evidence of acts that harmed others. Nonetheless, plaintiff must be directly injured
by at least one of the alleged predicates since a civil RICO action may not be based entirely
on third party standing. Until this is clarified in reported decisions, however, it would not
necessarily be frivolous for a defendant to move to dismiss on the ground that some of the
predicates underlying the alleged pattern caused injury to persons other than plaintiff.
40 656 F. Supp. 555 (N.D. IIl. 1987).
41 Id. at 557.
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within a quick time frame, and embraced a single transaction.
Plaintiffs' pleadings merely break down the alleged fraud in
connection with the awarding of the contract into its component
parts. Such allegations clearly fail to plead the requisite continu-
ity of criminal activity. 42
Robinson next sought to combine the 1981 and 1986 events. The court
rejected this argument as well, discerning neither continuity nor rela-
tionship between the two sets of activities:
A different Board was involved, a different type of service
contract was involved, and different corporations were the al-
leged victims. Moreover, the five-year period between the epi-
sodes is substantial and indicates the episodes were distinct
incidents.43
While the court was correct about the absence of continuity (and
therefore in dismissing the complaint), it adopted an unduly narrow
approach on the relationship issue, given that the same plaintiff owned
both service corporations and, although each corporation provided a
different service, they both provided services to the same institution and
were terminated under similar circumstances.
Robinson exemplifies the difficulty plaintiffs may face in their efforts
to successfully plead a RICO pattern. At least in some jurisdictions, a
pattern will be sustained only if the pleading creates the inference that
the defendant has repeatedly-perhaps uninterruptedly--engaged in the
same type of proscribed behavior over a significant period of time,
whether directed against plaintiff alone or plaintiff and others. In sum,
plaintiff must plead that defendant is an habitual criminal. 44
42 Id. at 559.
"' Id.; see also Conan Properties, Inc. v. Mattel, Inc., 619 F. Supp. 1167, 1171 (S.D.N.Y.
1985)(court refused to combine an unrelated 1970's securities fraud predicate with several
related 1980's wire and mail fraud predicates); United States v. Computer Sciences Corp.,
689 F.2d 1181, 1189 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1105 (1983)('Ve entertain some
doubt that Congress ever contemplated the extension of the RICO statute to include a
situation where one of the predicate offenses, separated in character and by a long time
period, could combine with a set of closely related wire fraud and mail fraud claims
essentially representing subdivisions of a single on-going illegal act to meet the predicate
requirements of so serious a statute").
"' As strictly formulated, the "pattern" tests do not account for certain scenarios that
evidence habitual criminality. For instance, if a person continuously victimizes others but
never uses the same method of commission more than once, he will not be liable under a
strict application of prevailing views because of the absence of relationship. Similarly, if a
defendant uses many different methods to victimize many unrelated persons at the same
time, there will be an absence of both continuity and relationship and therefore an absence
of RICO liability under prevailing standards. When these cases are adjudicated, it seems
likely that the court will relax the standards, or interpret the criteria in the disjunctive
rather than conjunctive, with the result that RICO liability will be imposed under such
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When plaintiff alleges unrelated episodes separated in time, dismissal
for failure to allege a pattern is not only mandated by the standards now
in effect, but is also appropriate. Such a plaintiff is simply alleging that
the defendant was '%ad" on more than one occasion. As the above
discussion demonstrates, "badness" is not the test for determining
whether a "pattern" has been pled or whether RICO liability should be
imposed. RICO is not a recidivist statute designed to punish people who
have manifested unseemly or even criminal behavior on more than one
occasion. 46 Rather, the statute affords private relief to plaintiffs who have
been injured in their business or property by a "pattern" of racketeering
activity. In the absence of a pattern (i.e., without continuity and rela-
tionship), plaintiff has no right to recover under RICO and is appropri-
ately relegated to whatever other remedies may exist under state or
federal law.46
]II. '"PRsoW" VERSUS "ENTERPRISE"
The activities proscribed by RICO are set forth in the four subsections
of 18 U.S.C. section 1962. Plaintiffs typically proceed under subsections
(a) and (c). Subsection (c) provides in part:
It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated
with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect,
interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly
or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a
pattern of racketeering activity ....
The vast majority of courts hold that the "person" contemplated by
section 1962(c) must be separate and distinct from the section 1962(c)
circumstances. Like most other tests, the "pattern" test will develop flexibility as a function
of age.
45 Bennet v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053, 1060 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied sub nom, Prudential
Ins. Co. v. Bennett, 464 U.S. 1008 (1983); United States v. Bledsoe, 674 F.2d 647, 659 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied sub nom Phillips v. United States, 459 U.S. 1040 (1982); John Peterson
Motors, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 613 F. Supp. 887, 899-900 (D. Minn. 1985).
46 What might be termed a fourth approach had been tentatively suggested by a panel
of the Third Circuit. In Petro-Tech, Inc. v. Western Co. of N. Am., 824 F.2d 1349 (3d Cir.
1987), the court expressly refused to define a RICO "pattern" (Id. at 1351), but expressed
doubt whether the pattern question could ever be properly resolved at the pleading stage
rather than on a full record. Id. at 1355-56. This was certainly one way of avoiding the
fracas. The Third Circuit seemed particularly fearful of being pinned down since a year
earlier, another panel also expressly refused to take a position on the post-Sedima meaning
of "pattern." See Malley-Duff & Assocs. v. Crown Life Ins. Co., 792 F.2d 341, 353 n.20 (3d
Cir. 1986), affd sub nom, Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 107 S. Ct.
2759 (1987). When the court finally directly addressed the question in Barticheck v. Fidelity
Union Bank, No. 86-5870 (3d Cir. Oct. 29, 1987) (WESTLAW, CTA database) (to be reported
at 832 F.2d 36), it opted for a case-by-case approach that was so individualized as to be
almost useless for purposes of prediction.
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"enterprise."47 This conclusion is based on a combination of the statutory
language and presumed congressional intent. Subsection (c) requires that
the person be "employed by or associated with" the enterprise. The
majority view finds that this language will not countenance identity
between the "person" and the "enterprise," since it is not logical to speak
of a "person" being employed by or associated with himself or itself. As to
legislative intent, the courts reason that the principal purpose for
enacting RICO, and for distinguishing the "person" from the "enterprise,"
is to prevent the takeover of legitimate businesses by criminals. While
punishing the infiltrating criminals (i.e., the "'persons") serves this
purpose, punishing the "enterprise"-the innocent victim of the racke-
teering activity-would be to punish the very entity the statute was
designed to protect.
On occasion, of course, the organization itself is a participant in the
criminal activity, rather than simply the victim, prize, or infiltrated
innocent. In this event, there is nothing inequitable in holding the
"enterprise" liable along with the "persons." The decision to apply the
enterprise/person distinction across the board rather than on a case-by-
case basis reflects the courts' implicit conclusion that it is preferable to
allow some criminal enterprises to escape liability than to risk the
imposition of liability on innocents. This comports with the rule that
criminal statutes must be strictly construed against imposition of pun-
ishment. However, as will be seen below, a number of courts have in
effect undermined this rule by allowing the same entity to be both the
person and the enterprise under 18 U.S.C. section 1962(a).
Whether the plaintiff has alleged a "person" distinct from an "enter-
prise" will in most cases be evident from the face of the complaint, as
when plaintiff alleges that the enterprise is a corporation and the persons
are individuals. An exception is when the plaintiff conclusorily asserts
that the "enterprise" is an association-in-fact composed of two or more
"persons."48 To prove the existence of a RICO enterprise, plaintiff must
47 See, e.g., Petro-Tech, Inc., 824 F.2d 1349; Bennett v. United States Trust Co. of N.Y.,
770 F.2d 308 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 800 (1986); B.F. Hirsch v. Enright
Refining Co., 751 F.2d 628, 633 (3d Cir. 1984); United States v. Computer Sciences Corp.,
689 F.2d 1181,1190 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1105 (1983); Bennett v. Berg, 685
F.2d 1053, 1062-63, cert. denied sub nom., Prudential Inc. Co. of Am. v. Bennett, 464 U.S.
1008 (1983); Medallion TV Enters. v. SelecTv of Cal., Inc., 627 F. Supp. 1290, 1295 (C.D.
Cal. 1986); McLendon v. Continental Group, Inc., 602 F. Supp. 1492, 1517 (D.N.J. 1985);
Kirschner v. Cablefrel Corp., 576 F. Supp. 234, 243 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Grant v. Union Bank,
629 F. Supp. 570, 574-75; Rush v. Oppenheimer & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1188, 1194 (S.D.N.Y.
1985); H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 648 F. Supp. 419, 426-28 (D. Minn. 1986);
Bruss Co. v. Allnet Communication Servs., Inc., 606 F. Supp. 401, 406-07 (N.D. III. 1985);
Color Sys., Inc. v. Meteor Photo Reprographic Sys., Inc., No. 86-2516 (D.D.C. May 8,
1987)(WESTLAW, DCT database).
48 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4)(1982) provides that an enterprise may be an association in fact.
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establish: (i) that the enterprise is an ongoing organization with a
framework for making and carrying out decisions; (ii) that the members
of the enterprise function as a continuing unit; and (iii) that the
enterprise has an existence separate and apart from the pattern of
racketeering activity through which its affairs are conducted. 49 In some
jurisdictions, these elements must be pled as well as proven.50 In others,
they need only be proven, and the pleading will suffice if it merely
identifies the enterprise rather than describes its attributes.51 In
jurisdictions where the enterprise's attributes must be pled, either as
part of a RICO pleading requirement or pursuant to the specificity
mandate of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), the pleading will
necessarily satisfy the burden of distinguishing between the person and
the enterprise. If the pleading fails in this respect, alternative grounds
should be cited in support of a motion to dismiss: failure to plead an
enterprise; failure to plead a RICO "person" distinct from the RICO
"enterprise"; and failure to plead with particularity under Rule 9(b).
The most equivocal scenario is when plaintiff has conclusorily alleged
an association-in-fact enterprise in a jurisdiction in which only the
identity of the enterprise need be pled. For instance, plaintiff alleges that
defendants A and B are RICO persons who operated through an associ-
ation-in-fact enterprise created by and consisting of themselves. If the
A-B enterprise is the same as, and no more than, A and B, then plaintiff
has failed to plead, and cannot prove, the person/enterprise distinction
required by section 1962(c). However, if A and B have created an
association that is more than the sum of themselves (i.e., an ongoing
organization separate from the alleged racketeering activity), then the
A-B enterprise would be distinct from A and B as persons, and the
person/enterprise distinction may be sustained. From the face of the
complaint, it will be impossible to determine which is the case, but as far
as enterprise pleading is concerned, plaintiff has satisfied the jurisdic-
tion's threshold requirements.
See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981); United States v. Local 560, Int'l Bhd. of
Teamsters, 581 F. Supp. 279, 330 (D.N.J. 1984), aff'd, 780 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 106 S. Ct. 2247 (1986);In re Energy Systems Equip. Leasing Sec. Litig., 642 F. Supp.
718, 740 (E.D.N.Y. 1986); Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384,
401 (7th Cir. 1984), aff'd, 473 U.S. 606 (1985); Fustok v. Conticommodity Servs., Inc., 618
F. Supp. 1074, 1076 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
'9 United States v. Riccobene, 709 F.2d 214, 221-24 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 849
(1983); United States v. DeRosa, 670 F.2d 889 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 993 (1982).
5o See Hanline v. Sinclair Global Brokerage Corp., 652 F. Supp. 1457, 1462 (W.D. Mo.);
appeal dismissed, 815 F.2d 713 (8th Cir. 1987); Otto v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 611
F. Supp. 83,89 (N.D. Ill. 1985), rev'd inpart on other grounds, 814 F.2d 1127 (7th Cir. 1986);
Laterza v. American Broadcasting Co., 581 F. Supp. 408, 414 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Khaimi v.
Schonenberger, 664 F. Supp. 54 (E.D.N.Y. 1987).
at See Seville Indus. Mach. Corp. v. Southmost Mach. Corp., 742 F.2d 786, 790 (3d Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1211 (1985).
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Under such circumstances, the defendant should move to dismiss for
failure to plead a person separate from an enterprise. 52 Although the
jurisdiction may not require that an enterprise be pled beyond
identification, it is required that the pleading make it evident that the
person is distinct from the enterprise. To satisfy this latter requirement,
it may not be necessary to plead all the attributes of the enterprise that
must be proven to recover RICO damages. However, it should be
necessary to supply enough information at least to raise the inference
that the alleged enterprise is distinct from the alleged persons. Were it
otherwise, the requirement that plaintiff plead a person distinct from an
enterprise under section 1962(c) could be automatically satisfied in
virtually every RICO lawsuit, since any plaintiff may conclusorily allege
an association-in-fact enterprise composed of any two or more defendants
or of one defendant along with one or more non-parties. This would
render the requirement superfluous. It would also be incompatible with
principles of judicial economy, since actions that could never proceed to
trial would be allowed to continue through a substantial amount of
pretrial discovery before it became evident that the persons and the
enterprise were one.
The situation is less clear with respect to 18 U.S.C. section 1962(a),
which provides in part:
It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income
derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering
activity.., to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such
income, or the proceeds of such income, in acquisition of any
interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise....
Section 1962(a), like section 1962(c), refers to a "person" committing an
unlawful act in connection with, but distinct from, an "enterprise." For
this reason, many courts have found that the language of section 1962(a)
also evidences a Congressional intent to distinguish the "person" from
the "enterprise."5 3 Other courts hold that the person and enterprise may
be the same under section 1962(a) on the ground that the provision
contemplates the enterprise using the proceeds of its own pattern of
racketeering activity (i.e., deriving the funds illegally and then investing
them in itself).5 4 Legislative history sheds little light on the subject, and
both judicial views are equally plausible.
52 See Klapper v. Commonwealth Realty Trust, 657 F. Supp. 948,954-57 (D. Del. 1987).
5' See, eg,, United States v.Computer Sciences Corp., 689 F.2d 1181, 1190-91 (4th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1105 (1983); McMurtry v. Brasfield, 654 F. Supp. 1222,1226-27
(E.D. Va. 1987); Williamette Say. & Loan v. Blake & Neal Fin. Co., 577 F. Supp. 1415,
1426-27 (D. Or. 1984); H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 648 F. Supp. 419, 428 (D.
Minn. 1986); Rush v. Oppenheimer & Co., Inc., 628 F. Supp. 1188, 1197 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
" See e.g., Petro-Tech, Inc. v. Western Co. of N. Am., 824 F.2d 1349 (3d Cir. 1987);
Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 747 F.2d 384 (7th Cir. 1984),
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The view that the person and enterprise may be the same under
subsection (a) is the majority view. Nonetheless, given the absence of
meaningful legislative history, the courts should place greater emphasis
on the facial language and structure of the law in divining the intent of
Congress. Since all subsections of section 1962 distinguish between
person and enterprise, such emphasis should lead to the conclusion that
the person and enterprise must be different. Therefore, even in jurisdic-
tions following the majority approach, a defendant should consider
moving to dismiss a section 1962(a) claim if the person and enterprise are
the same or the pleading fails to reveal whether they are different.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 should pose no obstacle since the
defendant can make a good faith argument for the reversal of existing
law in a jurisdiction that does not require the distinction. Such a motion
is advisable where the jurisdiction's court of appeals has yet to adopt a
position on the issue.55
IV. THE STANDING REQUmIEmS
RICO's civil liability provisions are afforded to plaintiffs injured in
their business or property by the defendant's racketeering activity.56
Many courts hold that such injury must be sustained by plaintiff
himself and that a party may not sue to redress injuries sustained as
an unintended consequence of defendant's act.57 Two discrete rules of
aff'd on other grounds, 473 U.S. 606 (1985); B.F. Hirsch, Inc. v. Enright Refining Co., 617
F. Supp. 49 (D.N.J. 1985); Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393,
1398 (9th Cir. 1986); Schofield v. First Commodity Corp. of Boston, 793 F.2d 28,31 (1st Cir.
1986); United States v. Freshie Co., 639 F. Supp. 442 (E.D. Pa. 1986); United States v.
Yonan, 622 F.Supp. 721 (N.D. Ill. 1985); Bruss Co. v. Allnet Communication Servs., Inc.,
606 F. Supp. 401, 407 (N.D. Ill. 1985); Rhoades v. Powell, 644 F. Supp. 64, 671 (E.D. Cal.
1986); Abelson v. Strong, 644 F. Supp. 524, 534 (D. Mass. 1986); DeMuro v. E.F. Hutton &
Co., 643 F. Supp. 63 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Vietnam Veterans of Am., Inc. v. Guerdon Indus., Inc.,
644 F. Supp. 951, 958 (D. Del. 1986); Pennsylvania v. Derry Constr. Co., 617 F. Supp. 940,
943 (W.D. Pa. 1985). Cf. Klapper v. Commonwealth Realty Trust, 657 F. Supp. 948, 954-57
(D. Del. 1987); Roche v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 658 F. Supp. 315, 320-21 (M.D. Pa. 1986),
which are hybrids of a sort, holding that the person and enterprise may be the same under
§ 1962(a), but only if the enterprise was neither the victim nor the prize of the proscribed
activities.
55 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b)(1984), rarely invoked, makes it unlawful for a person to acquire
or maintain an interest in an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity. Since its
structure more closely parallels § 1962(a) than § 1962(c), it is reasonable to assume that a
jurisdiction would treat it in the same way it treats § 1962(a).
56 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)(1984).
" See, e.g., Grant v. Union Bank, 629 F. Supp. 570, 573 (D. Utah 1986)("Only the
corporation in its own name [not a shareholder] can bring an action under section 1964 for
injuries allegedly caused it under section 1962"); Warren v. Mfrs. Natl Bank of Detroit, 759
F.2d 542 (6th Cir. 1985); Garbade v. Great Divide Mining & Milling Corp., 645 F. Supp. 808,
815-16 (D. Colo. 1986); Conan Properties, Inc. v. Mattel, Inc., 619 F. Supp. 1167, 1171;
Kearny v. Hudson Meadows Urban Renewal Corp., 648 F. Supp. 1412, 1418; Morast v.
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standing are involved. The first precludes third party standing and is
exemplified by cases holding that a shareholder may not commence a
RICO action to redress injuries to the corporation.5 8 This standing rule
does not require that all alleged predicates must have caused injury to
plaintiff, but rather that plaintiff himself must have been injured by
some part of the pattern. 9
The rule forbidding third party standing is well established and is
supported by the language and structure of the statute. Congress divided
deterrent functions between the government and private citizens, and
RICO therefore distinguishes between criminal prosecutions and private
actions.60 When the government prosecutes, there is no standing require-
ment comparable to that imposed on private litigants by 18 U.S.C. section
1964(c). Rather, an indictment or information may be based on proscribed
conduct injuring any person. By contrast, when a private party com-
mences a RICO action, at least some of the alleged actionable conduct
must have caused injury to their business or their property. To argue
otherwise is to disregard the fundamental criminal/civil bifurcation in
the RICO statute and the congressional intent on which it is based. In
sum, a RICO plaintiff may not act exclusively as a private attorney
general, though a lawsuit may have such collateral impact. Any other
result would be absurd, as the only realistic relief afforded by RICO to a
private plaintiff is money damages, and an uninjured plaintiff has no
damages to treble.
The second rule precludes a RICO suit when the causal connection
between plaintiff's injury and defendant's act is insufficiently proximate.
Although the plaintiff has been injured, he is not among the class of
persons for whom RICO provides a remedy. The proximate cause rule is
exemplified by Cenco Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman,6' where purchasers of
securities commenced a RICO action against the issuer, alleging fraud-
ulent inflation of the price of the stock. Plaintiffs also sued the issuer's
independent auditors, claiming they failed to detect the fraud. The
auditors cross-claimed against the issuer under RICO on the ground that
being joined as defendants was an injury that would not have been
Lance, 631 F. Supp. 474 (N.D. Ga. 1986), aft'd, 807 F.2d 926 (11th Cir. 1987); Maryville
Academy v. Loeb Rhoades & Co., 530 F. Supp. 1061 (N.D. Ill. 1981); Icon Group, Inc. v.
Mahongany Run Dev. Corp., 112 F.R.D. 201, 205-06 (D.V.I. 1986); Levey v. E. Stewart
Mitchell, Inc., 585 F. Supp. 1030,1034-35 (D. Md. 1984), aff'd without op., 762 F.2d 998 (4th
Cir. 1985). But see Alexander Grant & Co. v. Tiffany Indus., Inc., 563 F.Supp. 35, 36-37
(E.D. Mo. 1982), rev'd, 742 F.2d 408 (Sth Cir. 1984), aff'd, 473 U.S. 606 (1985).
68 Grant, 629 F. Supp. at 573; Warren, 759 F.2d at 544.
19 See Marshall & Isley Trust Co. v. Pate, 819 F.2d 806 (7th Cir. 1987).
60 Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1963 with 18 U.S.C. § 1964. See Blakey & Gettings, Racketeer
Influenced And Corrupt Organizations (RICO): Basic Concepts-Criminal and Civil Reme-
dies, 53 TEiep. L.Q. 1009 (1980).
" 686 F.2d 449 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982).
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sustained but for the issuer's racketeering activity. Dismissing the RICO
cross-claim because the auditors were not directly injured by the racke-
teering activity, the court noted that Congress did not intend "to create in
the wake of every RICO violation waves of treble-damage suits by all who
may have suffered indirectly from the violation."6 2 Similarly, plaintiffs
have been non-suited when they allege injury caused by their resignation
or termination after having discovered that their employers were en-
gaged in activities proscribed by RICO.63 It thus appears that the only
proper RICO plaintiff is someone whom the defendant intended to harm
by his racketeering activity, or whose injury was a reasonably foreseeable
and direct consequence of such activity.
There is dispute surrounding the rule that plaintiff must be directly
injured by the alleged racketeering activity, and a number of courts have
held that no such proximate causation is needed.64 While this view is
presently in the minority, it is supported by the fact that 18 U.S.C.
section 1964(c), on its face, requires only injury to plaintiff's business or
property by reason of a violation of section 1962. It makes no reference to
such injury being "direct." Were courts to grant standing to "bystanders"
indirectly harmed by alleged racketeering activities, the increase in
sustainable RICO actions would nearly offset the decrease occasioned by
the restrictive interpretation of the "pattern" requirement ushered in by
Sedima.
For the present, a defendant should move to dismiss a RICO claim if it
appears that: (i) none of the alleged injuries were sustained by plaintiff;
or, (ii) the injury sustained by plaintiff was not a proximate result of the
defendant's alleged racketeering activity.
V. INJURY "BY REASON OF" A VIOLATION OF 18 U.S.C. SECTION 19 6 2 (A)
RICO affords a private right of action to a person injured "by reason of"
a violation of section 1962 of the statute.65 Section 1962(c) makes it
unlawful for a person to conduct the affairs of an enterprise through a
pattern of racketeering activity. Injury "by reason of" a violation of
section 1962(c) is therefore the same as injury caused by the underlying
racketeering activity. This was one of the principal holdings in Sedima,
which rejected the requirement of a section 1962(c) injury other than that
62 Id. at 457.
6 Nodine v. Textron, Inc., 819 F.2d 347 (1st Cir. 1987); Todd v. Bio-Scientific Clinical
Laboratory, Inc., No. 85-C-9163 (N.D. IMI. April 15, 1986)(WESTLAW, DCT database).
" See, e.g., Acampora v. Boise Cascade Corp., 635 F. Supp. 66, 69 (D.N.J. 1986)(dis-
charged employee stated RICO claim when she was harassed and then fired as a result of
discovering her employer's RICO activities); Rodonich v. House Wreckers Union, Local 95,
627 F. Supp. 176 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
65 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).
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resulting from the RICO predicates, variously characterized as a "rack-
eteering enterprise" injury or a "competitive" injury.6 6
The situation is different under section 1962(a), which makes it
unlawful for a person who has received income from a pattern of
racketeering activity to invest such income in the operation of an
enterprise.67 In order for a plaintiff to establish injury "by reason of" a
violation of section 1962(a), he must prove that the injury was caused by
the defendant's investment of ill-gotten gains in an enterprise, rather
than by the racketeering activity through which the funds were initially
obtained.68 Some courts, however, apparently overconstruing Sedima's
comments directed to section 1962(c), have held that a section 1962(a)
violation may be established by proving injury from the racketeering
activity alone.6 9
The better view is that a section 1962(a) injury must flow from the act
of investing in an enterprise. To hold otherwise is to read section 1964(c)'s
"by reason of" language out of the statute and thus dispense with the
congressionally intended distinction between section 1962(a) and section
1962(c). Such a major revision should emanate from Congress rather than
from the courts. 70 This is not inconsistent with Sedima, since the
Supreme Court addressed only section 1962(c), and with respect to all
subsections of section 1962, the Court noted that "the plaintiff only has
standing if... he has been injured in his business or property by the
conduct constituting the violation."71 The conduct constituting the viola-
66 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
67 See Note, Investigating Dirty Money: Section 1962(a) of the Organized Crime Control
Act of 1970, 38 YAx. L.J. 1491 (1974).
63 In re Gas Reclamation, Inc. See. Litig., 659 F. Supp. 493 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Gilbert v.
Prudential Bache Sec., Inc., 643 F. Supp. 107, 109 (E.D. Pa. 1986); Kirschner v. Cable/Tel
Corp., 576 F. Supp. 234,242 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Heritage Ins. Co. v. First Natl Bank of Cicero,
629 F. Supp. 1412, 1417 (N.D. 111. 1986); Eastern Corporate Fed. Credit Union v. Peat,
Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 639 F. Supp. 1532, 1536-37 (D. Mass. 1986); DeMuro v. E.F.
Hutton & Co., 643 F. Supp. 63 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. General Elec.
Co., 656 F. Supp. 49,82-84 (S.D. Ohio 1986); Prodex, Inc. v. Legg Mason Wood Walker, Inc.,
No. 86-1950 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 6, 1987)(WESTLAW, DCT database); Huntsman-Christensen
Corp. v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., No. C86-0530G (D. Utah Nov. 24, 1986)(WESTLAW,
DOT database); Waldschmidt v. Crosa, 177 Ga. App. 707,340 S.E.2d 664,667 (1986); Roche
v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 658 F. Supp. 315, 321-22 (M.D. Pa. 1986)(grudgingly upholding the
requirement).
69 See, e.g., Haroco, Inc. v. American Natl Bank & Trust Co., 647 F. Supp. 1026, 1033
(N.D. Ill. 1986); Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 642 F. Supp. 781,
805-07 (E.D. La. 1986); King v. E.F. Hutton & Co., RICO Bus. Disp. Guide (CCH) 6578,
6840 (D.D.C. 1987). Suggesting but not expressly holding the same result are B.F. Hirsch,
Inc. v. Enright Refining Co., 617 F. Supp. 49 (D.N.J. 1985); Vietnam Veterans of Am., Inc.
v. Guerdan Indus., Inc., 629 F. Supp. 983 (N.D. 111. 1986); Pennsylvania v. Derry Constr. Co.,
617 F. Supp. 940 (W.D. Pa. 1985).
7 Bankers Trust Co. v. Feldesman, 648 F. Supp. 17, 24-26 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
7' 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
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tion of section 1962(a) is "investing."72 Nor is it inequitable to impose
such a standing requirement under section 1962(a). If the plaintiff has
sustained injury from a pattern of racketeering activity, he will be able to
recover treble damages under section 1962(c). 73 The only plaintiffs who
will be deprived of relief are those who must allege that the person and
enterprise are the same in a jurisdiction that allows this under section
1962(a) only. Such plaintiffs will have no recourse to section 1962(c), and
this is as it should be.
Many RICO plaintiffs will have difficulty alleging injury resulting
from the defendant's investment in an enterprise. A plaintiff alleging
securities fraud, for example, will have lost a sum certain paid in
exchange for securities. Since plaintiff's injury resulted from racketeer-
ing activity that culminated in the sale of securities, whether the
defendant thereafter invested the purchase price in an enterprise cannot
be causally related to plaintiff's injury. Under such circumstances, a
motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is in
order.
VI. PLEADiNG FRAUD WiTH PAnucuLArry
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) requires that fraud be pled with
particularity. This requirement is designed to accomplish three purposes:
(i) to provide a defendant with adequate notice of the charges levelled
against him so that the defendant will be able to prepare an adequate
answer and defense; (ii) to eliminate complaints that seek to obtain
discovery of unknown fraud; and, (iii) to protect a defendant from injury
to his reputation from frivolous or unfounded charges of wrongdoing.7 4
Since the label "racketeer" attaches to a RICO defendant from the
moment the action is filed, the third criterion is particularly important in
the RICO context. Many plaintiffs rely on the stigma associated with
72 The same result should obtain under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b), where the conduct
constituting the violation is the acquisition or maintenance of an interest in, or control of,
an enterprise. See supra note 55.
73 See Gilbert v. Prudential Bache Sec., Inc. No. 83-1513, slip op. at 2-3 (E.D. Pa. May
7, 1986)(WESTLAW, DCT database):
It is argued that, unless persons like this plaintiff are accorded "standing" to
pursue civil claims based upon violations of § 1962(a), there can be no civil
liability for violating that section. Even if this were correct, it would not justify
disregarding the plain language of § 1964(c) and § 1962(a). The RICO statute,
after all, is primarily a criminal statute; and I know of no universal legal principle
to the effect that every criminal offense must give rise to a corresponding civil
action for damages. But I belive the premise is flawed: using the proceeds of
racketeering activities to infiltrate legitimate businesses can obviously cause
damage to many persons, who would have a perfect right to sue. It just happens
that plaintiff is not among them, in my view.
7' Grant v. Union Bank, 629 F. Supp. 570, 575; Crystal v. Foy, 562 F. Supp. 422, 424
(S.D.N.Y. 1983).
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RICO to orchestrate early settlements of claims that are meritless. For
the defendant, the motion to dismiss is the only way to oppose such efforts
at their inception.
Rule 9(b) applies to any RICO claim based on allegations of fraud,75 and
most RICO complaints allege securities, wire, or mail fraud. Some courts
have gone further, applying Rule 9(b)'s specificity mandate to all RICO
claims, including those that are not predicated on fraud.76 In any event,
moving to dismiss for failure to particularize is more likely to lead to
emendation of the pleading than to outright dismissal. Dismissal will
occur only if, after several rounds of motion practice, plaintiff has
persistently refused to obey court orders requiring greater specificity in
his pleading. Even then, it is rare for a RICO complaint to be dismissed
solely because of plaintiffs failure to particularize the underlying facts.
Failure to comply with Rule 9(b) is more likely to be cited as an
alternative basis for dismissal.
Jurisdictions are divided on just what must be particularized and with
what degree of specificity. Among the allegations that must be particu-
larized in some jurisdictions are the following: the enterprise; the
distinction between the enterprise and the racketeering activity; the
predicate acts; probable cause that the predicate acts were committed;
willfulness or intent underlying commission of the predicates, when these
are elements of the underlying offenses; and a distinction between the
acts taken by different defendants.77
For purposes of Rule 9(b), the underlying predicate acts are of greatest
significance since the manner in which they are pled will largely
determine whether the defendant is adequately apprised of the charges.
Plaintiffs often have been required to plead the time, place and manner
of each alleged fraudulent communication.7 8 This requirement has been
relaxed by some courts to allow for substitute means of specifying
conduct, particularly when the alleged fraud is complex, involves many
7 See Mauriber v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 391, 394 (S.D.N.Y.
1982).
7 See, e.g., Taylor v. Bear Stearns & Co., 572 F. Supp. 667, 682 (N.D. Ga. 1983).
7 See Acampora v. Boise Cascade Corp., 635 F. Supp. 66, 68 (D.N.J. 1986)(predicate
acts); Sims v. Faestel, 638 F. Supp. 1281, 1284 (E.D. Pa. 1986), affd without op., 813 F.2d
399 (3d Cir. 1987)(fraudulent concealment); Satellite Fin. Planning Corp. v. First Nat'l
Bank of Wilmington, 633 F. Supp. 386,402-05 (D. Del. 1986), modified, 643 F. Supp. 449 (D.
Del. 1986); McLendon v. Continental Group, Inc., 602 F. Supp. 1492, 1509 (D.N.J.
1985)(knowledge and intent underlying alleged mail fraud); Alfaro v. E.F. Hutton & Co.,
606 F. Supp. 1100 (E.D. Pa. 1985)(probable cause); Kalmanovitz v. G. Heileman Brewing
Co., 595 F. Supp. 1385, 1401 (D. Del. 1984), affd, 769 F.2d 152 (3d Cir. 1985); Bruss Co. v.
Allnet Communication Servs., Inc., 606 F. Supp. 401, 405 (N.D. Ill. 1985)(distinguishing
among acts ofmultiple defendants); Medallion TV Enters., Inc. v. SelecTV of Cal., Inc., 627
F. Supp. 1290, 1294 (C.D. Cal. 1986)(enterprise).
78 See, e.g., McGinty v. Beranger Volkswagon, Inc., 633 F.2d 226, 228 (1st Cir. 1980);
Cash v. Frederick & Co., Inc., 57 F.R.D. 71, 77 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
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persons or occurs over a substantial period of time.79 This trend is
particularly evident in the Third Circuit by virtue of the 1984 decision in
Seville Industrial Machinery Corp. v. Southmost Machinery Corp.80
In Seville, plaintiff alleged that the defendant had violated RICO by
committing multiple frauds in a series of transactions spanning nearly
two years and involving over 700 pieces of equipment.81 The District
Court dismissed the complaint for failure to describe the date, time or
place of the phone calls and letters through which the fraudulent schemes
were allegedly accomplished. The Third Circuit reversed on the ground
that "[p]laintiffs are free to use alternative means of injecting precision
and some measure of substantiation into their allegations of fraud."8 2
Plaintiff had done this by annexing to the complaint exhibits that
identified "with great specificity" which pieces of equipment were the
subject of which alleged fraudulent transactions.8 3
Some courts have interpreted Seville as generally displacing the
requirement that the time and place of each fraudulent incident must be
set forth in the pleading. Others have held that the alternative means of
alleging fraud recognized in Seville are confined to cases where the
underlying transactions are so complex that traditional means are
unsuitable.84 Where the number of parties is limited and the alleged
predicates are temporally and geographically circumscribed, a defendant
should argue that traditional particularity requirements should not be
displaced. In any event, even under Seville and decisions like it, the
requirement of specificity is not eliminated; rather, the means by which
it may be satisfied are expanded. If specificity is not pled by traditional or
alternative means, defendant should move to dismiss.
Given that the particularity test is amorphous, almost every RICO
defendant will be in a position to move for dismissal under Rule 9(b). The
likelihood that such a motion will be necessary is increased by plaintiffs'
awareness that (i) failure to plead with adequate particularity will at
worst result in an order requiring an amended pleading; and, (ii) in many
" See, e.g., Seville Indus. Mach. Corp. v. Southmost Mach. Corp., 742 F.2d 786 (3d Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1211 (1985); Tomera v. Galt, 511 F.2d 504, 508 (7th Cir. 1975);
Micro-Medical Indus., Inc. v. Hatton, 607 F. Supp. 931, 936-37 (D.P.R. 1985); Verges v.
Babovick, 644 F. Supp. 150, 155 (E.D. La. 1986); Systems Research, Inc. v. Random, Inc.,
614 F. Supp. 494, 497-500 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
so 742 F.2d 786 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1211 (1985).
81 Id. at 787.
s2 Id. at 791.
83 Id.
84 See, e.g., Alfaro v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 606 F. Supp. 1100 (E.D. Penn. 1985) where 80
plaintiffs sought class certification to prosecute claims arising in many parts of the country.
The court held it would be unduly burdensome to require plaintiffs to plead the time, place
and manner of each alleged misrepresentation. Id. at 1108. It noted, however, that if the
class was not certified, the two representative plaintiffs would be required to particularize
their allegations in the traditional manner. Id. at 1109 n.3.
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cases, specificity will render plaintiff more vulnerable to dismissal on
other grounds. Plaintiffs will therefore withhold information from their
initial pleadings on the theory that there is no downside to doing so. If no
Rule 9(b) motion is made, the plaintiff has succeeded in increasing the
defendant's burden on discovery. If such a motion is made, the plaintiff
may amend his pleading and will in the meantime have imposed an
additional burden on the defendant by forcing him to make the motion.
VII. THE STATUTE OF LzirrxoNs
A. The Limitations Period
The limitations period governing civil RICO claims has until recently
been the subject of controversy. The statute itself does not provide for a
limitations period. Its only reference to time, in a civil context, is the
definition of a "pattern of racketeering activity," which requires that one
of the predicate acts occur after the effective date of the statute (October
13, 1970), and that the last predicate act occur within ten years of a prior
act, excluding periods of imprisonment. 85
The search for an applicable limitations period begins with the Rules of
Decision Act, which provides:
The laws of the several states, except where the Constitution or
treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise
require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil
actions in the United States, in cases where they apply.8 6
The Supreme Court has interpreted this statute as requiring that in the
absence of a federal limitations period, a federal court must apply the
statute of limitations of the most analogous state cause of action, barring
a determination that Congress, despite its silence, intended otherwise.8 7
Relying on this statute, federal courts seeking a statute of limitations for
RICO claims initially turned to the law of the forum.
Prior to 1985, most courts adopted a "case-specific" approach, borrow-
ing the limitations period for the state action most analogous to the
alleged predicate acts underlying the RICO claim being analyzed.8 8 A
RICO claim based on securities fraud would be governed by the limita-
tions period of the forum's blue sky law, while a RICO claim based on
8" I8 U.S.C. § 1961(5).
8 28 U.S.C. § 1652. See Hill, State Procedural Law In Federal Nondiversity Litigation,
69 HAuv. L. REV. 66 (1955); Mishkin, The Variousness of "Federal Law": Competence And
Discretion In The Choice of National and State Rules For Decision, 105 U. PA. L. Rv. 797
(1957).
87 See Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 395 (1946); Del Costello v. International
Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 131, 158-59 (1983).
' See, e.g., Polite v. Diehl, 507 F.2d 119 (3d Cir. 1974).
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embezzlement of pension funds might be governed by the forum's
limitations period for conversion. The list could go on almost endlessly,
since the statute references a large number and wide variety of predicate
acts.8 9
Not surprisingly, many problems arose from this application. Given
that a RICO plaintiff must allege at least two acts of racketeering in
order to arguably plead a "pattern" of racketeering activity,90 a complaint
will often allege two or more different predicate acts rather than two or
more repetitions of the same predicate act. The result was that different
predicates might be governed by different state limitations periods.
Assuming that these predicates could otherwise combine to form a
pattern of racketeering activity, the pattern might be destroyed if the
RICO claim were time-barred by the shortest state limitations period
analogous to one of the predicates.
Another problem was that the court in each case was required to spend
an inordinate amount of time determining which state cause of action
was most analogous to the RICO claim and then which limitations period
governed that action. The "case-specific" approach also led to inequitable
results. Within each state, certain RICO plaintiffs were deprived of their
claims simply because the defendant's acts were most analogous to state
actions commanding a shorter limitations period. But RICO nowhere
suggested that the appropriateness of treble damage awards should vary
from predicate to predicate based on the fortuity of state limitations
periods. Similarly, RICO plaintiffs in different states fared differently
based on the fortuity of living in a jurisdiction with a longer or shorter
limitations analogue, and this resulted in forum shopping. In sum, the
"case-specific" approach led to confusion, inequity, and a strain on
judicial resources and was thus destined to be replaced.
Prior to 1985, a similarly particularized approach was used to deter-
mine the state statute of limitations to be applied by a federal court to
claims arising under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 which, like RICO, did not
have its own limitations period. This practice came to an end in 1985 with
the Supreme Court's decision in Wilson v. Garcia,91 where the Court held
that interests in "uniformity, certainty and the minimization of unnec-
essary litigation" required rejection of the "case specific" approach and
adoption within each state of a uniform limitations period. 92
Lower federal courts immediately applied Wilson's reasoning to civil
RICO cases. They now searched for the state cause of action most
analogous to a generic RICO claim, rather than to the predicate acts
underlying any particular RICO claim. Among the candidates were: (i)
89 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1).
90 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5).
91 471 U.S. 261 (1985).
92 471 U.S. at 273.
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the limitations period governing common law fraud, since although not
all predicates related to fraud, the most commonly alleged predicate acts
were mail, wire, and securities fraud; (ii) the limitations period governing
a state's anti-racketeering statute, if it had one; (iii) the limitations
period governing a state's statutory action for civil penalties or forfei-
tures; and, (iv) the catchall limitations period covering claims for which
no limitations period was otherwise provided.9 3 It was also occasionally
argued that federal courts should turn away from state law and borrow a
uniform limitations period from an analogous federal statute, such as the
Clayton Act's four-year limitations period for private treble damage
antitrust suits, or criminal RICO's five-year limitations period.
94
Different courts resolved the matter differently, and during the two
years following Wilson, there was a trend toward achieving uniformity of
RICO limitations periods within each state. However, there was no inter-
state uniformity, and judicial resources were still being depleted in an
effort to discern the state cause of action most analogous to allRICO claims
and the limitations period governing that cause of action. The strain on
judicial economy was lessened, however, since once an appellate court
determined the appropriate RICO limitations period for a particular state,
the district courts in that state would follow suit. But until this occurred,
district courts in the same state would frequently disagree, and the in-
terstate disparity still led plaintiffs to shop for the best RICO forum.95
Then the United States Supreme Court decided Agency Holding Corp.
v. Malley-Duff & Associates, Inc.,90 holding that all civil RICO claims
would be governed by the four-year limitations period of the Clayton Act,
11 See, e.g., Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc. v. Crown Life Ins. Co., 792 F.2d 341 (3d Cir.
1986), aff'd on other grounds, 107 S. Ct. 2759 (1987)(adopting Pennsylvania's six-year
catchall limitations period); Durante Bros. & Sons, Inc. v. Flushing Nat'l Bank, 755 F.2d
239 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom, Durante Bros. & Sons, Inc. v. National Bank of N.Y.C.,
473 U.S. 906 (1985)(adopting New York's three-year period for actions to recover upon a
liability, penalty or forfeiture created by statute). See also Note, Civil RICO: Searching for
the Appropriate Statute of Limitations in Actions Under Section 1964(c), 14 Loy. U. Cm. L.J.
765 (1983).
See Malley-Duff & Assoc. Inc., 792 F.2d at 350 n.17; Note, Civil RICO: A Call For A
Uniform Statute of Limitations, 13 Fosmum URBAN L.J. 205 (1985); Note, Limitation
Borrowing In Federal Courts, 77 MICH. L. Rv. 1127 (1979).
" There was an additional complicating factor in that the courts recognized that no
matter how analogous a state action might be to RICO, its limitations period would be
ineligible if it was so short as to contravene federal policies underlying RICO. Malley-Duff
& Assoc., 792 F.2d at 347 n.13. Thus, merely locating the cause of action most analogous to
RICO would not necessarily solve the problem. What was needed was the state action with
a sufficiently long limitations period that was most analogous to RICO. This increased the
judicial burden even more since it was never clear just what length of time would suffice.
See, e.g., Electronics Relays (India) Private Ltd. v. Pascente, 610 F. Supp. 648 (N.D. Ill.
1985)(holding two-year period adequate); Malley-Duff & Assoc. Inc., 792 F.2d at 351-52
(suggesting that one year would be too short).
96 107 S. Ct. 2759 (1977).
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thus side-stepping the usual practice of looking to state law and going
even further than it had two years earlier in Wilson, where the unifor-
mity was only intra-state. Adopting the ABA's characterization of the
then-current state of RICO limitations law as "confused, inconsistent,
and unpredictable,"97 the Court concluded as a matter of policy that only
a nationally uniform period could avoid such intolerable uncertainty and
time-consuming litigation.9s Finding that RICO was more analogous to
the Clayton Act's private treble damage action for antitrust violations
than to any state law alternative, the Court borrowed the four-year
limitations period provided by 15 U.S.C. section 15b.99
When the last predicate act alleged in a RICO complaint occurred more
than four years before the lawsuit was filed and the plaintiff has failed to
allege fraudulent concealment of that act by the defendant, a RICO action
is now time-barred and may be dismissed pursuant to motion under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) or 56. The defense will be more
complicated if the plaintiff alleges fraudulent concealment since the
federal equitable tolling doctrine provides that the statute of limitations
does not begin to run until plaintiff knows or with due diligence should
know the material facts underlying his cause of action.100
B. Fraudulent Concealment
Fraudulent concealment may be active or passive. Active or affirma-
tive concealment occurs when, after commission of the underlying
offense, the defendant takes affirmative steps to conceal from plaintiff the
existence of the underlying facts. The underlying offense may, but need
not be, fraud. Passive concealment occurs only when the underlying
offense is fraud. Here, the misrepresentation that is a necessary element
of the underlying fraud also acts to conceal the fraud from plaintiff. The
defendant does nothing other than commit the initial offense.
Some courts require active fraudulent concealment as a basis for
equitably tolling the applicable statute of limitations.10 1 Others will toll
on the basis of passive concealment (i.e., underlying fraud), if it prevents
the plaintiff from discovering the fraud despite due diligence.10 2 In any
97 Id. at 128.
91 Id. at 129.
99 Id. at 134.
100 See Biggans v. Bache Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc., 638 F.2d 605,608 n.3 (3d Cir. 1980).
Even before Agency Holding Corp., 107 S. Ct. at 2754, when state law provided the
limitations period for a RICO claim, it was the federal law of equitable tolling that
determined when the limitations period began to run on a federal claim. Alfaro v. E.F.
Hutton & Co., 606 F. Supp. 1100, 1106 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
101 See, e.g., Volk v. D.A. Davidson & Co., 816 F.2d 1406 (9th Cir. 1987).
102 See, e.g., Hauptmann v. Wilentz, 570 F. Supp. 351 (D.N.J. 1983), aft'd, 770 F.2d 1070
(3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 887 (1986).
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event, most jurisdictions require that fraudulent concealment be pled
with particularity, a requirement derived from the conjunction of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) and the federal equitable tolling doctrine
itself.103
Although Rule 9(b) has been applied less than vigorously in the RICO
context, the equitable tolling doctrine will insure that fraudulent con-
cealment is specifically pled. This is appropriate given the circumstances
surrounding a claim of fraudulent concealment and the fundamentality
of a statute of limitations. The issue arises only when it appears from the
face of the complaint that the action is time-barred. Since it is the
plaintiff who is filing an action after the statute of limitations has
presumptively expired, plaintiff should bear the burden of establishing
why equity should toll the limitations period.
The threshold question for defense counsel is whether plaintiff has
properly pled fraudulent concealment. Generally, a plaintiff is required
to specifically plead and thereafter prove the following four elements:104
(i) that the defendant wrongfully concealed the basic facts disclosing the
existence of the action; (ii) that the plaintiff remained ignorant of the
facts; (iii) that the plaintiff made diligent efforts to discover the facts;
and, (iv) the reasons why such diligent efforts did not result in and could
not have resulted in earlier discovery of the facts.10 5 If the RICO
complaint fails to plead these elements, defendant should, in lieu of
answering, move to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Since such a motion is not deemed a responsive pleading under Federal
103 See, e.g., Corson v. First Jersey Sec., Inc., 537 F. Supp. 1263, 1268 (D.N.J. 1982);
Campbell v. Upjohn Co., 498 F. Supp. 722,727 (W.D. Mich. 1980), aff'd, 676 F.2d 1122 (6th
Cir. 1982); Kroungold v. Triester, 407 F.Supp. 414, 419 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
104 See, e.g., Hupp v. Gray, 500 F.2d 993, 996 (7th Cir. 1974); Kroungold, 407 F. Supp. at
419.
105 Some courts dispense with the requirement of due diligence if there has been
affirmative fradulent concealment. Thus, the limitations period would begin to run upon
plaintiffs actual discovery of the facts regardless of when a reasonably diligent person
should have discovered the facts. See, e.g., Tomera v. Galt, 511 F.2d 504 (7th Cir. 1975). The
majority of courts do not carve out this exception. See Campbell v. Upjohn Co., 676 F.2d
1122,1128 (6th Cir. 1982); Ohio v. Peterson, 651 F.2d 687 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
895 (1981); Plain v. Flicker, 645 F. Supp. 898, 902 (D.N.J. 1986); Hill v. Equitable Bank
Nat'l Assn., 599 F. Supp. 1062,1076 n.16 (D. Del. 1984). It has been noted that if affirmative
concealment eliminates the requirement of diligence, the policy of repose underlying
statutes of limitations would be thwarted since the statute would be tolled indefinitely
"while evidence stales, memories fade and courts and adversaries wait, until the plaintiff at
his leisure alleges actual discovery, despite the avalanche of evidence that would put all but
the most diligent plaintiffs on notice of a cause of action." Campbell, 676 F.2d at 1128. Even
in a jurisdiction where affirmative concealment overrides the necessity of due diligence, a
defendant should move to dismiss if plaintiff has failed to plead with particularity acts of
affirmative concealment.
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Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a),106 plaintiff will have the opportunity to
amend his pleading as of right to conform to the aforesaid requirements.
Nonetheless, if the conclusory assertion of fraudulent concealment was
spurious to begin with, the motion to dismiss may eliminate the RICO
claim in its entirety.
Defendant should at the same time move for summary judgment, since
it is well established that a motion to dismiss on limitations grounds may
be styled as a motion for summary judgment.10 7 Such a motion will
increase plaintiffs responsive burden. In other to make such a motion, it
is not necessary for the defendant to submit information or documenta-
tion refuting plaintiff's conclusory assertion of concealment. Since plain-
tiff has the burden of pleading, production and proof on this issue, and
given that a defendant moving for summary judgment need not submit
supporting affidavits, 0 8 defendant will have discharged his burden by
noting that the complaint is time-barred on its face and fails to properly
plead fraudulent concealment. However, if the complaint on its face does
properly plead the elements of fraudulent concealment, the moving
defendant will then bear the burden of producing evidence to affirma-
tively establish that no concealment took place.109
The summary judgment motion will shift the burden of production to
plaintiff. A party opposing such a motion may not rest on his pleadings,11o
or on affidavits or counsel,"' and may not avoid the issue until discovery
or trial.112 Plaintiff will therefore be required to submit an affidavit based
on personal knowledge containing the information required to sustain a
claim of fraudulent concealment. Technically, the burden will not shift
until the court determines that fraudulent concealment has not been
properly pled. However, since most plaintiffs will respond to the Rule
12(b)(6) and Rule 56 motions simultaneously, plaintiff is likely to
generate affidavits even before the court has determined that there is a
pleading defect.
In this scenario, there is no downside for the moving defendant. If the
fraudulent concealment claim is genuine, the defendant will now know
what plaintiff knows and thus obtain unilateral expedited discovery. If it
is spurious, this is more likely to be revealed on a motion for summary
judgment, since the party's fear of peijury will exceed his or her fear of
Rule 11 sanctions for providing false information to the attorney to be
10 See Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir.
1986).
107 See, e.g., Solinski v. General Elec. Co., 149 F. Supp. 784 (D.N.J. 1957).
108 FED. R. Crv. P. 56(b); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
109 See Richards v. Mileski, 662 F. 2d 65, 71 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
110 FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574
(1986); Cowgill v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 780 F.2d 324, 329 (3d Cir. 1985); United States v.
Lattauzio, 748 F. 2d 559, 561 (10th Cir. 1984).
... United States v. Halpern, 260 F. 2d 590, 591 (3d Cir. 1958).
112 Corson v. First Jersey Sec., Inc., 537 F. Supp. 1263, 1268-69 (D.N.J. 1982).
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included in an unverified pleading. In other words, a meritless assertion
of fraudulent concealment will be exposed if plaintiff fails to submit an
affidavit opposing the defendant's motion for summary judgment." 3
It will not always be apparent whether fraudulent concealment has
been properly pled. The answer will be clear only at the extremes. If the
complaint does not mention concealment or merely states in a conclusory
fashion that as a result of fraudulent concealment, plaintiff did not
discover the material facts until a particular date, the pleading will not
be sustained. At the other extreme, a pleading will be sustained if the
complaint specifically pleads each of the required four elements of
fraudulent concealment, unless defendant can definitively establish that
such allegations are false.
There is a substantial gray area in which plaintiff will probably be
afforded the benefit of any doubt. After all, if defendant engaged in
fraudulent concealment and did a good job of it, one would not expect
plaintiff to be aware of all the surrounding circumstances without the
benefit of discovery. Hence, if plaintiff has particularized two or more of
the four required elements, and has pled the reasons for his inability to
plead the other elements, the court in its discretion should either sustain
the pleading on its face or require affidavits in order to confirm that
plaintiff is justifiably unable to plead all the elements.
Where plaintiff sustains its burden and the motion for summary
judgment is, or is about to be, denied, and the defendant firmly believes
that no concealment took place, the defendant should request immediate
discovery limited to the issue of fraudulent concealment. This will avoid
costly litigation of an action that in fact turns out to be time-barred.
Defendant may request that the court reserve decision on the motion
until this discovery is completed or, if the motion has already been
denied, may either move for reconsideration or notice a new motion for
summary judgment, if the discovery reveals the absence of fraudulent
concealment.
Defendant may wish to support the motion with materials outside the
pleading.11 4 This is likely to occur in RICO actions since the predicate
offenses may have formed the basis for prior related actions between the
11 Astute counsel representing plaintiff should seek leave to refrain from opposing the
summary judgment portion of the motion until the court determines that fraudulent
concealment has not been properly pled. Even then, plaintiffs counsel should file an
amended complaint and thereby seek to short-circuit the responsive burden placed on his
client by a motion for summary judgment.
114 If this occurs, it would seem that the motion would definitely be one for summary
judgment rather than failure to state a claim since FED. R. Crv. P. 12(b) provides that if the
court considers matters outside the pleading in resolving a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, it shall be
converted to a motion for summary judgment. In fact, the mere review of matters outside
the pleading does not result in conversion. Only if the court finds such matters to be
essential to its disposition will conversion take place. Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227, 229
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parties or between the plaintiff and non-parties. 15 Since the plaintiff
would have constructive knowledge of prior pleadings and other docu-
ments that were part of the record in a prior action, the moving
defendant, by alerting the court to such materials, may establish that
plaintiff was placed on notice of the material facts early enough to
time-bar the RICO claim.
VIII. CONCLUSION
It is impossible to set forth all grounds for dismissing every RICO
complaint. The scope of this Article is to explore several grounds for
dismissal that are likely to repeatedly arise. A minimum of six threshold
inquiries should be made when reviewing a RICO complaint: (i) whether
the plaintiff alleged sufficient continuity and relationship among predi-
cate acts to establish a "pattern" of racketeering activity; (ii) whether the
plaintiff alleged a RICO "person" that is distinct from the RICO "enter-
prise"; (iii) whether the plaintiff alleged that it was injured as a result of
defendant's alleged conduct, and that such injury resulted directly from
such conduct; (iv) whether the plaintiff, when proceeding under 18 U.S.C.
section 1962(a), alleged injury by reason of defendant's investment in an
enterprise; (v) whether the plaintiff particularized his or her allegations;
and (vi) whether the last alleged predicate act occurred within four years
of the commencement of the action, and if it did not, whether the plaintiff
alleged fraudulent concealment with particularity. Provided that any one
of these is answered in the negative, defendant, in lieu of filing an
answer, should move to dismiss for failure to state a claim and/or for
summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) or 56,
respectively.
Until Congress limits the scope of civil RICO, or the Supreme Court
decides to elaborate upon Sedima's footnote, such motion practice is the
best protection for non-racketeer civil defendants against lawsuits that
are often no more than legalized forms of blackmail.
(9th Cir. 1980); Paul S. Mullin & Assoc., Inc. v. Bassett, 632 F. Supp. 532, 534-35 N.1 (D.
Del. 1986); Angleton v. Pierce, 574 F. Supp. 719, 723 N.1 (D.N.J. 1983), affd without op.,
734 F.2d 3 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 880 (1984). Moreover, if the matters outside the
pleading consist of public records (e.g., pleadings or discovery filed in a prior related action),
they may be judicially noticed in lieu of conversion. FED. R. Evm. 201; Mack v. South Bay
Beer Distribs., Inc., 798 F.2d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir. 1986); Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 162
F.2d 36, 48 n.20 (3d Cir. 1947); Abernathy v. Erickson, 657 F. Supp. 504 (N.D. Ill. 1987).
Judicial notice would seem particularly appropriate under such circumstances since such
records, in this context, will not be submitted to establish the truth of their contents but
only to show when plaintiff was placed on notice of the facts underlying his RICO action.
I's If there have been prior related actions between the parties and if the jursidetion has
a single or entire controversy rule, defendant should also move to dismiss on the ground
that plaintiff failed to assert his RICO claim in the earlier action. However, where the prior
action was in state court, this defense will succeed only in those few states where the courts
have held that state courts have concurrent jurisdction over RICO. See supra note 2.
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